Smokescreen 17

Summing up the ultimate smokescreen - the winter crisis

Let’s sum up the facts reported in the last three posts:

Excess winter mortality is a historical event, described since the XVII century

Excess winter morbidity is a historical phenomenon, described since at least the Victorian era.

The phenomenon is foreseeable and forecastable within weeks, without the help of demented modellers.

As such, the increase in “business” is eminently plannable for.

The phenomenon is complex, with factors including an ageing population, climate and seasonal factors, longevity with multiple pathologies, overcrowding, a spike in demand, and an increase in infectious events.

Countries in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres experience the phenomenon during the winter months, but few respond with the same level of panic as the UK.

Once winter peaks, the phenomenon is hardly discussed, either officially or in mainstream media.

Politickers, senior managers, “experts”, and the media make unclear statements as to its cause, abusing vague, unscientific terms such as “Flu”.

There are no attempts to study the drivers of morbidity and mortality, their impact, or their transmission.

Attention is focused on the extreme cases that present in hospital or A&E

Crowding and frailty provide good grounds for infection, debilitation through dehydration and neglect, pushing the death toll up.

Causes of death are attributed on the basis of recent history or symptoms without serious investigations.

The remedies proposed are, by and large, evidence-free or based on limited, poor-quality evidence.

The widely touted vaccination plans, which cover only a handful of agents, are based on poor evidence yet receive financial incentives in primary care.

Plan after plan proposed and sometimes implemented are never assessed

No effort is made to fill gaps in evidence for preparing the NHS through “dry runs” or organisational changes made on the basis of flexibility or evidence.

No national funding calls are directed to addressing the RV-HAI problem.

We therefore conclude that the NHS winter crisis is a real phenomenon. Its effects could be minimised by planning, impartial, robust research and good management.

In its current guise, RV-HAIs provide an excellent smokescreen for other actions, such as diverting cash and favouring the pharmaceutical and research industries and selected providers. The patients, the population for which governments are responsible, are a useful instrument to cover up for such actions.

Apart from these points - do let us know if we have missed any - it will be business as usual come next winter.

This post was written by two old geezers. It is dedicated to the memory of those poor souls who died alone, in pain and cold at home, in a hospital corridor, in a nursing home or in some other abode of horror.