Summary of the UKHSA and MHRA information received about the H5 Avian Influenza Vaccine.
A long read
Modified from Al Nisbet
Before Christmas, we started a series of FOI requests to clarify how taxpayers' money is spent on pandemic preparedness. We were responding to the news that the UKHSA had purchased 5,147,670 doses of an Influenza H5 “pandemic” vaccine from CSL/Sequirus Ltd.
We were unconvinced by the evidence of a threat from avian influenza produced by the UKHSA.
So, we investigated the product, which was not named in the UKHSA announcement, and found a 17-to-1 vaccine-to-placebo ratio of deaths and the Risk Management Plan written by Sequirus and approved by EMA. On page 21, it mentions all the rare neurological harms observed in the 2009 Pandemrix roll out, plus vasculitis.
Perhaps someone in EMA has a memory as long as ours.
We grouped our questions into six sets to try and dodge the £450 limit on requests. The questions are listed here:
We sent the request under the FOIA via the platform WhatDoTheyKnow.
Over two months later, this is how far we have got.
Question 1 Information on the purchase of influenza H5 vaccine or platform.
After a bit to heave and pull we got to the contract. Here is the first page:
The redacted version of the contract is here:
For further details, you can buzz off. They are commercially sensitive, and their release could compromise future fair adjudication.
If every detail is secret, we will never know who will judge fair adjudication of the use of our money. The Fairy Godmother perhaps.
The UKHSA also told us to look up the tender here. However, the tender is for an H5N1 product, not the H5N8, which eventually made its way to our shelves.
We protested by quoting our TTE readers that taxpayers should know how much the deal cost.
The silence is deafening.
Question 2 Performance of the purchased influenza H5 vaccine or platform.
UKHSA answered they had no clue; we should ask MHRA
It seemed strange that the UKHSA was worried about ensuring a fair and secure competition to ensure best value for money in the tendering procedure if they had no clue about the performance of what they bought. Still, we did as we were told and sent a request to X at xxxxxxxx@xxxx.xxx.xx.
The MHRA responded by telling us that EMA had licensed the H5N1 vaccine from another manufacturer 15 years previously. So is it H5N1 or H5N8? And is it Sequirus or Novartis?
We remarked that they may have so many avian influenza vaccines on their shelves that it is easy to get confused. But we looked again at the documentation.
EMA’s rules report that you can piggyback on an existing similar pharmaceutical if you have bioequivalence studies showing just that. But that is if you have a drug based on a chemical formula, which is not the case for vaccines that are essentially made in vats and tested for potency equivalence.
We looked for the bioequivalence studies in the EPARs and couldn’t find them (see here and here). We also looked at the history of the market authorisation. There is nothing to see here, either.
However, it received Conditional Marketing Authorisation because it addresses an unmet medical need, which currently relates to one possible case of avian influenza in the UK.
All this bioequivalence made us nervous. There were echoes of the vaginal mesh affair. The approving of a device because it equivalent to its “predicate” of precursor device 30 years before.
So, we asked for the bioequivalence studies. The TTE office is still waiting for a response.
Question 3 Indications of the purchased influenza H5 vaccine or platform.
Who is the vaccine indicated for? For example, can pregnant women use the product? We got the same answer: Ask the MHRA.
The TTE office asked the MHRA and is still awaiting an answer.
Presumably it is safe and effective - end of the story.
Question 4 Properties of the purchased influenza H5 vaccine or platform.
The UKHSA does not hold any information on the properties of what it bought, nor does it have modelling assumptions on which the purchase is based.
As we found this very odd, we asked for an internal review of the response.
Question 5 Costs of the purchased influenza H5 vaccine or platform.
The price of the vaccines is GBP XXX,XXX. The contract ends on 25 November 2025. Shelf life is about 18 months.
However, Carl’s sleuthing of the UKHSA transparency data spending over £25,000 showed spending in December 2024 (line 146 of the sheet) for NHS SUPPLY CHAIN - PANFLU vaccines of £15,500,000.00. Going back through the data for 2024, Carl found spending of £4.5M in May, £10M in June, £2.5M in July, £15M in September, £ 1.5M in October, and £500K in November.
So, using the December data, the total for PanFlu vaccines in 2024 could be £49.5 million to sit on the shelf; another tranche of cash will be required to replace it when it expires. Under the current secrecy agreements, no one will know when the next lot is due and how many millions will be wasted again.
Question 6 What is your definition of a case of avian influenza?
The answer was………..’information not held’.
After an intensive discussion at the TTE office, we applied some logic. A respiratory virus is a threat if it is infectious, i.e., capable of spreading from A to B and, in this case, from a bird to a human being. If you do not know the definition of infectiousness, how do you know it’s a threat?
We asked for another internal review, which should be with us soon, we hope.
At this stage, we wrote a friendly letter to XXXX.
Meanwhile, we received news of a case of avian influenza in England. The UKHSA reported that bird-to-human avian flu transmission is rare, reporting it has occurred previously in a small number of times in the UK.
So, after more intensive discussions, we asked which tests were carried out on the case and were told it was all a big secret because the tests could identify the person. So, when members of the public request the information, it’s a no-go, but when UKHSA can report similar information in a publication or an HMG website, it’s OK?
We responded by reply, indicating the double standards applied to our request
and reminded them of their duty by law to respond to our request.
So far, we have chronicled our efforts to understand UKHSA's actions. But our readers have suggested two more elements.
In her thesis, Myra looked at data relating to Avian Influenza around the globe.
Myra does not mention cases of avian influenza H5N8, but she cites “an outbreak of H5N1 among poultry in Hong Kong that resulted in 18 reported human cases (Chan, 2002). Since then, sporadic, localised human infections with various subtypes have been reported, though there is no evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission. Cumulatively, approximately 870 cases of H5N1, 1,500 cases of H7N9, 80 cases of H5N6 and 80 cases of H9N2, and sporadic cases of other subtypes of Avian Influenza”.
In Myra’s Appendix E (page 82 of the dissertation), we counted 10 combinations of H and N antigens potentially pathogenic to humans. This means that manufacturers and those intent on protecting us could produce at least ten stockpiled vaccines, which could be replaced in cycles as they expire. There would be no problems there—as we pay.
What threat did Myra’s thesis identify? Appendix E reveals that combined RT-PCR and viral isolation were performed in 152 of the 409 cases to confirm a diagnosis of AI. The RT-PCR Ct value was reported in only 100 of the 245 cases where RT-PCR was conducted. Genome sequencing was carried out in 111 out of 298 specimens, and 55 out of 354 specimens were tested for other pathogens.
Myra identified 870 cases of influenza H5N1 from 1997 up to 2024 (page 14) from a variety of published reports. According to WHO "Globally, from 1 January 2003 to 12 December 2024, 954 cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) virus were reported from 24 countries. Of these 954 cases, 464 were fatal (CFR of 49%). WHO also reports provenance of some of the cases in more detail.
Myra’s dissertation reports cases to June 2024, while the WHO reports to December 2024, hence the discrepancy.
“From 1 January 2003 to 21 December 2023, a total of 248 cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) virus were reported from four countries within the Western Pacific Region (Table 1). Of these cases, 139 were fatal”. 161 (61%) of these were identified in 2003-2009. Therefore, in the last 16 years, 39% of the total has been identified. Has the avian influenza H5N1 virus been identified in fewer humans, or is the detection of earlier cases highly doubtful?
There is certainly an overlap between the two totals, but the message is that the total is unclear, the case definition is unstated and WHO does not mention cases of H5N8 in its report. Few cases have a reported viral load of genome sequencing making it impossible to ascertain viral load or lineage for all cases in whichever total you pick.
With the widespread use of PCR and the promotion of avian influenza as a threat, we would expect a much higher case ascertainment.
Then RonL provided us with the response to a FOI request he sent to UKHSA.
Interestingly, some of the statements contradict the answers we got. For example, UKHSA knows that the H5N8 contains an adjuvant. Well, we knew that from the contract, but apparently, the FOI responders did not.
However, the fascinating data come from the EMC or Electronics Medicine Compendium.
When you scroll through the warnings section and have gone through screen rolls obsessing about antibody responses to the vaccine (does that remind you of the MHRA Covid EWG by the way?), you come to this sentence.
And
So, to sum up:
At least every 18 months, the British taxpayer forks out nearly 50 million GBP for an untested vaccine, an unknown entity for an incredible threat “just in case”. The sponsors of this excellent deal refuse to answer direct questions and, hence, aren’t accountable to their funders. They practice the bureaucratic equivalent of football’s tiki-taka, rugby’s body swerves and stonewall building around commercial confidentiality and “fairness” about adjudicating a product they seem to know nothing about.
There is a real danger that whatever motivates this gravy train will procure other exotic vaccine varieties for different combinations of the H and N lottery. As physicians, we advise avoiding avian influenza products until accurate clinical data are available. Stay away from the MSM and follow regulatory sources other than the MHRA. For now, the EMA and EMC will do.
As taxpayers, we would like an urgent parliamentary inquiry with the involvement of the NAO to understand where all the money goes. In the meantime, the MSM can keep reporting on the Chancellor’s hair colour.
We have sent three more requests:
The first asking for a copy of the informed consent sheet that provided or advised by UK MHRA to be used to those offered H5 avian influenza vaccines.
The second asking whether there are differences in the production processes between different types of avian influenza vaccines (e.g. H5N1, H5N8 etc), adjuvanted or not.
The third asking whether there are differences in the production processes between influenza seasonal and avian vaccines, split, adjuvanted or not.
This post was written by two old geezers who will keep at it.
BTW we plan to update the post as more replies to our FOI requests come in, it’s simpler than doing single posts. We will put the usual notice POST UPDATED ON (DATE).
Thanks for the comments and keep them coming.
An old geezer.
Thank you - I'm in awe of the huge work you put in. Are you channelling your inner terriers who don't let go once something is between their teeth?
Congrats to reader Myra on her PhD dissertation: what a meticulous research! And thank you, reader RonL: your FOI has produced an admission which makes me doubt the sanity and competence of the MHSA. If there's no immunity provided by those vaccines, why buy them with our money, and force them on us?